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I. Introduction 
Participants in the subprime residential mortgage market never en­
visioned widespread default} and lenders and investors in that market 
did not foresee the risk involved with subprime loans.2 The subprime mar­
ket enjoyed significant growth from 2000 to 2006, increasing from 6 per­
cent of all mortgage loan originations to 25 percent in 2006.0 As the market 
grew, originators eased underwriting standards, began writing more loans 
with adjustable rates, accepted lower or no down payments, and stopped 
requiring documentation of borrower incomes.4 Originators of subprime 
mortgages learned that the sale and securitization of those loans resulted 
in a quick return of capital and permitted them to make more loans while 
avoiding the consequences of their underwriting practices.5 Because un­
derwriting standards were loose and home prices were escalating, most 
subprime borrowers who encountered financial difficulty before 2007 re­
lied upon escalating housing prices and easily available credit to refinance 
their way out of troubie.6 Loan originators ""'ho pooled and sold their loans 
to investors had little incentive to ensure that borrowers could actually af­
ford them.7 
In early 2007, investors and lenders began to see the results of lax under­
writing standards when delinquency rates for subprime loans originated in 
2006 greatly exceeded the rates for those loans underwritten before 2005.a 
Lenders responded by tightening credit standards.9 Private mortgage in­
surers also tightened underwriting standards, making mortgages even 
harder to get. 10 As underwriting criteria tightened, many subprime bor­
rowers found that they could not refinance their mortgages. 11 
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Lax underwriting, followed by tightened credit standards and declining 
home values, have contributed to rapidly escalating rates of foreclosure. 
The number of foreclosure filings skyrocketed in the first quarter of 2008, 
when approximately 550,000 homes began the foreclosure process-more 
than double the average quarterly rate in earlier years.12 In 2008, an esti­
mated three million loans are predicted to default. This is a sharp increase 
from 2007 and 2006 when one and a half million and one million loans were 
in default, respectively.13 
Nationally, housing prices have declined 16 percent from their high in 
the spring of 2006.14 Even greater drops in value have been seen in some 
areas, such as Sacramento, California, where median home prices have 
reportedly fallen 34 percent in the last year.15 Additional declines of 10 per­
cent to 15 percent from the fall of 2008 to mid-2009 are predicted.16 Those 
declines have resulted in an estimated 12 million homeowners owing 
more on their mortgage than their home is worth, a significant increase 
from 4.1 million homeowners in 2007. 17 
The rising numbers of foreclosures and the decline in housing values 
have resulted in a variety of proposed legislative fixes, ranging from state 
moratoriums on foreclosure filings to permission for bankruptcy court 
judges to write down principal balances on debtors' loans. None of the 
measures gained significant momentum until July 26, 2008, when the Sen­
ate passed amended bill H.R. 3221, the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 (HERA). The president signed the bill on July 30, 2008. 
HERA includes several sections intended to reduce the rising tide of 
foreclosures. It modernizes the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) 
operations;18 establishes the HOPE for Homeowners Program (HOPE pro­
gram), which will provide federal insurance when lenders voluntarily write 
down the principal balance owed on mortgages; and amends the Truth in 
Lending Act to insulate some servicers from potential litigation risk if they 
agree to modify principal amounts due on mortgage loans under the HOPE 
program. 19 
The purpose of this article is to describe key provisions of the HOPE 
program and examine the likelihood that it will indeed reduce foreclosures 
and stabilize the mortgage market over the three years during which the 
program is effective. 
II. HOPE Program 
Title IV of HERA, which is entitled "HOPE for Homeowners Act of 
2008," amends Title II of the National Housing Act.20 Its purpose is to assist 
homeowners in avoiding foreclosrnes, support long-term sustainable home­
ownership, stabilize and provide confidence in the mortgage markets, 
and provide "servicers of delinquent mortgages with additional methods 
and approaches to avoid foreclosure." 21 The HOPE program, as it was en­
acted, sought to accomplish those purposes tluough a voluntary program 
in which the first mortgage is modified or refinanced and the principal 
balance is reduced to no more than 90 percent of the market value of the 
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property it secures.22 In return, the first mortgage lienholder is eligible for 
FHA insurance on the reduced principal amount, which in effect insulates 
the lienholder from future declines in housing prices or risk of loss through 
foreclosure. The HOPE program faces many obstacles that stem from 
HERA's voluntary nature and from the securitization of many of the resi­
dential mortgages that might be eligible for participation in the program. 
On October 3, 2008, the HOPE program was amended by the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), in an effort to broaden the 
program's reach.2-' 
Unfortunately, the I-IOPE program is not likely to have a significant ef­
fect on the rising number of foreclosures or in ::.tabilizing the mortgage mar­
ket. HERA limits the Fl-{ A's authority to insure mortgages under the HOPE 
program to a total aggregate principal amount of $300 billion of mortgages 
during the period beginning October 1, 2008, and ending September 31, 
2011 .n The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that only 400,0D() 
borrovvers will refinance under the !-!OPE program.25 (-:;iven the current 
rates of default, a predicted three million in 2008 alone, the HOPE pro­
gram could help only a fraction of the homeowners who default before the 
program ends in 2011.16 The sheer number of anticipated defaults and the 
increasing numbers of people who owe more on their mortgages than 
the value of their homes will make it difficult for the HOPE program to stabi­
lize housing prices or significantly reduce the number of foreclosures. Unfor­
tunately, even more barriers to success exist. Each will be discussed in detail 
after a brief review of the! !OPE program's requirements and function. 
To participate in the HOPE program, a borrower 
1. 	 must not be intentionally in default,27 
2. 	 must not have provided false information to obtain a mortgage that is 
eligible for the HOPE program,28 
3. 	 as of March 1, 2008, must have had or thereafter is likely to have, due 
to the terms of the mortgage being reset, a mortgage debt-to-income 
ratio greater than 31 percent,'-9 
4. 	 must not be able to afford his or her mortgage payments,-m 
5. 	 must have entered into the mortgage on or before January 1, 2008,"'1 
and 
6. 	 must only have an ownership interest in one residence that is the bor­
rower's principal residence and secures the mortgage debt.'2 
The I !OPE program severely restricts the provisions that may be in­
cluded in loans insured by the program.33 Loans must have terms of at 
least thirty years,YI may not exceed the reasonable ability of the borrower to 
make payments,30 and must have a fixed interest rate.36 Initially, the HOPE 
program required the principal balance of the loan to be no more than 
90 percent of the market value of the property but that provision was 
amended to permit a higher percentage.37 Lenders are permitted to charge 
a 1 percent origination fee. 38 Interest rates, although required to be fixed, 
are to be commensurate with the market rate for comparable loans.39 The 
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existing senior lender/servicer must agree to waive all penalties for pre­
payment or refinancing and any fees and penalties relating to default or 
delinquency40 and release its lien on the property in return for receiving the 
proceeds from the program mortgage. Finally, all subordinate lienholders 
must agree to have their interest extinguished upon refinancing with the 
program.41 
In return for a future equity position, borrowers must agree tu share 
that equity, as well as any appreciation in their home, with the FHA.42 Spe­
cifically, borrowers must share any equity created by the 1-fOPE program 
if they sell or refinance their home. After the first year of the loan, 90 per­
cent of any equity created by sale or refinancing belongs to the rHA, and 
10 percent belongs to the borrower. This declines to a shared equity in the 
fifth year and thereafter. 4~ Borrowers must also equally share with the Fl-IA, 
upon sale or disposition, the appreciation in their home that occurred after 
the date the mortgage was insured under the !-!OPE program.41 ff a sec­
ond lienholder had an interest extinguished during the refinancing, that 
secondary lienholdcr may also share in the appreciation of the property or 
receive a cash payout instead.'·' 
In addition to forgiving a portion of the principal amount due, the ex­
isting lienhulder must also pay the initial 3 percent FHA insurance pre­
mium on the new HOPE loan.'6 for the life of the loan, borrowers must 
continue to pay an additional 1.5 percent annual premium based on the 
remaining principal balance of the mortgage.47 Because the FHA insures 
the entire balilnce of the new principal amount, in effect, the lienholder is 
insulated from further market risk if home prices go down and foreclo­
sure results. Borrowers also agree not lo get a second mortgage on their 
home during the first five years of the mortgage, except those loans that 
ensure that the property meets maintenance standards.40 Second liens re­
lated to property maintenance may be permitted only if the loan does not 
reduce the value of the government's equity, and if the total of the second 
loan combined with the first mortgage docs not exceed 95 percent of the 
home's value.'·~ 
The HOPE legislation gives the program's board of directors'i(} the ability 
to "establish requirements and standards for the program" and prescribe 
such regulations and ... guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to im­
plement such requirements and standards."51 The HOPE board issued mies 
establishing the core requirements for the program on October 6, 2008.0' The 
rules took effect without a public comment period upon their publication in 
the Federal Register and will be codified at 24 C.F.R. Part 4001. 
The 1-IOPE program is voluntary. Neither first mortgage holders nor 
subordinate lienholders are required to participate. Lienholders that be­
lieve that they will benefit from reducing the principal balance of the mort­
gage rather than foreclosing will participate. Because many mortgage loans 
are sold by their originators and securitized, entities servicing those loans 
for the investors that own them will have to determine if loan modifica­
tions under the HOPE program are in the best interest of those investors.53 
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To encourage mortgage servicers to participate, HERA also amended the 
Truth in Lending Act54 by adding a new section that defines the fiduciary 
duty of a servicer for a pooled residential mortgage where the duty is not 
established by contract with the servicer.ss 
III. Obstacles to Success 
The HOPE program faces substantial barriers to accomplishing its goals, 
including the program's voluntary nature, the number of loans that have 
been securitized, and the role of the servicer with securitized mortgage 
pools. CBO estimates that nine million homeowners with outstanding sub­
prime and Alt-A loans could qualify for the HOPE program.% Out of those 
nine million, CBO estimates that the HOPE program will only assist an 
estimated 400,000 borrowers and a recent FHA estimate predicts that only 
13,300 borrowers will be assisted in the first year of the HOPE program.57 
Because participation in the HOPE program is voluntary, all participants 
must determine that they can derive a benefit from the program before con­
senting to participate. The borrower, the lienholder (or the loan servicer on 
behalf of the lienholder), and subordinate lienholders must also agree upon 
the terms of their participation. Each of these parties has unique issues and 
circumstances that will affect the decision, as discussed below. 
A. Borrowers May Not Be Eligible or Willing to Participate 
Borrowers (and their lenders) may not initially know if they are eligible 
for the HOPE program. The legislation contains requirements for borrower 
eligibility, but one of the requirements needs further clarification-despite 
publication of further guidance and rules.58 The program requires borrowers 
to certify that they have not intentionally defaulted on a mortgage eligible 
for the HOPE program (or any other debt). HERA criminalizes a willful false 
statement concerning that matter. The program regulations define inten­
tional default as when (1) a borrower knowingly failed to make payment on 
the mortgage or debt, (2) a borrower had available funds at the time payment 
was due that could have paid the mortgage or debt without undue hardship, 
and (3) the debt was not the subject of a bona fide dispute.59 Because undue 
hardship is not defined and a numerical standard such as a total debt to 
gross income ratio is not employed, borrowers (and lenders) may not be sure 
whenan intentional and disqualifying default has occurred. Haveborrowers 
intentionally defaulted because they chose to pay private school tuition for 
their children instead of the mortgage? What about health insurance? A lux­
ury car payment? A contribution to a 401(k) plan? A credit card payment in 
excess of the monthly minimum? 
Even if a mortgage holder or servicer determines that the borrower is 
eligible to participate in the HOPE program, the delinquent borrower may 
be difficult to find. Servicers report that they engage in a variety of tactics 
to get borrowers to return phone calls, including sending free cell phones 
to borrowers to encourage them to call back.6(1 More than half of borrowers 
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in foreclosure proceedings have no contact with their lender.61 One lender 
reported that it attempted to help 300 seriously delinquent homeown­
ers avoid foreclosure, but only thirty-eight responded.62 Unfortunately, 
although approximately 20 percent of homeowners believe that nothing 
will happen after missing three or more payments,63 interest rates charged 
under the HOPE program may become unaffordable after repeated months 
of default cause further damage to a borrower's credit score. 
Even if borrowers are eligible for the program and engaged in discus­
sions with their lenders, will they understand and be able to assess whether 
the HOPE program provides a better alternative to foreclosure for them? 
Although borrowers receive a future equity position in their home, the cost 
of participating in the HOPE program is significant. Participation requires 
that borrowers not only accept the loss of value in their home but also un­
derstand that any future appreciation in value must be shared equally with 
FHAwhen the property is sold. 64 Borrowers must also pay market rate inter­
est, a one percent origination fee, and an annual premium of 1.5 percent for 
FHA insurance. The FHA has already acknowledged that HOPE loans will 
have higher interest rates because of the distressed nature of the borrowers 
entering the HOPE program. Higher interest rates will adversely affect the 
affordability of HOPE loans.65 Some borrowers may decide that the program 
is too expensive and choose to walk away from their current home after 
purchasing a smaller, less expensive home.66 
Understandably, default rates clearly depend on the amount of equity 
homeowners have in their home.67 Given that borrowers in the HOPE 
program will initially have no equity, a substantial number of partici­
pants in the HOPE program may end up in default. One study found 
that a significant number of borrowers, approximately 40 percent, who 
entered into a forbearance agreement or modification re-defaulted within 
one year.68 Other industry participants have pegged re-default rates at 30 
percent to 45 percent.69 One rating agency found that 20 percent of loans 
that had been modified in 2006 had re-defaulted in the first six months 
of 2007.7°CBO has predicted that about one-third of the HOPE program 
loans will end in default.71 The FHA acknowledges that developing work­
able underwriting standards for distressed borrowers is challenging and 
that while more lenient standards will increase participation in the HOPE 
program, more lenient standards will also result in higher defaults. 72 
Both regulators and industry participants agree that re-defaults are less 
likely if loan modifications result in loans that are truly affordable for 
borrowers.73 
B. Securitization and Loan Servicers May Block Participation 
The majority of subprime mortgage loans are securitized and serviced by 
entities that did not originate the loan.7' Servicers typically collect mortgage 
payments and pay them to the investor or lender that holds the mortgage, 
manage escrow funds for taxes and insurance, and engage in collection 
and loss mitigation efforts when borrowers default. For more than a year 
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before the creation of the HOPE program, servicers had been encouraged 
to engage in appropriate loan modifications to ensure long-term afford­
ability for borrowers.7' Nevertheless, servicers failed to modify loans.76 
According to a September 2007 survey conducted by Moody's Investment 
Services, sixteen servicers representing 80 percent of the subprime market 
had modified only 1 percent of loans that experienced interest rate resets in 
early 2007.,-; Servicers rely heavily on repayment plans7~ instead of modifi­
cations to assist borrowers in trouble.n Servicers also arc relying on extend­
ing the initial interest rate on adjustable rate mortgage::. (ARMs) for up to 
five years.80 Unfortunately, the effectiveness of techniques such as repay­
ment or forbearance agreements is decreasing.81 
A brief explanation of the securitization process is necessary to under­
stand the important role that servicers play in determining whether a will­
ing and eligible borrower can participate in the HOPE program. Before 
securitization became prevalent, most borrowers dealt with lenders that 
originated their own loans and held them on their books as assets until 
maturity. Lenders that held those loans were careful to use appropriate un­
derwriting standards to minimize their risk. As the subprime market gre>v, 
originators of subprime mortgages quickly learned that ::.ale and securitiLa­
tion of those loans resulted in a quick return of capital, permitting them to 
make even more loans and escape the consequences of lax underwriting.82 
Generally, subprime mortgage originators 1nade loans and transferred those 
loans to a separate third party. l"he third parties combined those loans into 
a large pool and sold to investors the rights to receive payments due under 
the mortgages making up the pool. The process of pooling those mortgages 
and selling interests in the payments due is known as securitization. 
Sccuritization converts individual mortgages (and the rights to receive 
payments on those mortgages) into mortgage-backed securities. Usually, 
the entity securihzing the loan tries to isolate the loans from the lender or 
originator in order to protect investors if the lender or originator files for 
bankruptcy. This is done by selling the loans to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) that is separate from the lender or originator. Such a sale also erects 
a barrier to borrowers seeking to pursue claims of inappropriate lending 
practices because the purchasers may become "holders in due course" and 
thus immune to suit.SJ The loans are then transferred to another SPV, usu­
ally a trust, that ultimately holds the loans and is the issuer of the mortgage­
backed securities. 
The issuer, with the help of an investment bank, divides different pay­
ment streams from the mortgages into different types of securities with 
different risks. The different types of securities are called tranches. The in­
vestment bank usually determines the structure of the tranches by deter­
mining what attributes will appeal to investors."' 111.e most senior tranches 
arc securities with the least risk and usually are paid first. The lowest tranche 
usually has the most risk and is the first group of investors to experience 
losses. Some of the tranches may receive interest payments, and some may 
receive principal payments. Some tranches might be structured to receive 
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prepayment penalties.80 The trust that holds the loans is ultimately respon­
sible for collecting moneys due from the mortgages and distributing those 
funds to the investors. l'he trust that owns the loans usually has no em­
ployees and instead retains servicers tu collect interest, principal, and fees 
and to engage in loss mitigation efforts. Some pools may have one or more 
entities engaged in servicing the loans. Fur example, some trustees engage 
a master servicer who will then engage a servicer who may, in turn, engage 
subservicers. 
Securitization directly impacts the ability of borrowers to have their loans 
modified or refinanced under the HOPE program. Only approved FHA lend­
ers \vho volunteer for the HOPE program may originate HOPE loans.so The 
special purpose vehicles that ov.'n securitized mortgages as well as many of 
their servicers do not have origination capability and are not approved Fl-!A 
lendcrs.07 If those servicers want defaulting borrowers to participate in the 
HOPE program, they will have to rely upon FHA-approved lenders to assist 
those borrowers and originate the l-{OPE loans. 
Even if a servicer has origination capability through an approved FHA 
lender participating in the program, the ability of borrowers to participate 
in the HOPE program can be affected in other ways. First, servicing agree­
ments contain clauses that limit the ability of the servicer to enter into loan 
modifications.88 Second, because loan modifications can result in a reduc­
tion of the interest rate, principal, or term, they may result in a benefit to 
one investor and a loss to another, thereby exposing the servicer to claims 
of breach of contract and fiduciary duty.8" Third, according to industry re­
ports, serviccrs are simply ovelVllhelmed with the number of defaults and 
do not have the specially trained staff to modify loans. Finally, the current 
structure of servicer compensation makes it unlikely that servicers wil! en­
gage in large numbers of loan modifications under the J-{OPE program. 
Because loan modifications have a potentially significant impart on invest­
ment performance, servicing agreements contain clauses that limit the abil­
ity of the servicer to enter into loan modifications.'Xl An estimated one-third 
of loan pool::. restrict the number of loans that may be modified?' A typical 
threshold is 5 percent of the pool.92 Some pools do not permit any modifi­
cations.'3 Other pools limit the ability to extend the term of the underlying 
Joans. 94 Some securitization deals give investors the right to demand that 
borrowt>rs go to foreclosure if their interest will be extinguished through a 
modification.% The servicing agreement may also require the servicer to wait 
until the borrower is thirty or more days delinquent before it can modify the 
loan.96 Still other servicing agreements require the loan to be either in default 
or reasonably foreseeable to default before a modification may be made.97 
Even if the servicing agreement contains no specific limitation on loan 
modifications, the language regarding the servicer's ability to modify 
loans may be so vague that servicers are unlikely to test the limits of their 
authority.98 Many servicing agreements contain language requiring the ser­
vicer to perform its obligations in the best interest of the investors or in the 
same manner that the servicer would service its own loans.99 Unfortunately, 
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there is no recognized method or process for gaining investor approval for 
amendment of the servicing agreement; and even if such a process existed, 
not all investors would agree. 
Servicers are also unlikely to engage in substantial modifications or ac­
cept proceeds of a HOPE program refinance and release their liens because 
investors may second-guess whether such actions resulted in a benefit to 
a particular investor or tranche or to the pool as a whole.100 Servicers may 
also be second-guessed because of potential conflicts of interest that arise if 
they have a residual ownership interest in the pool.101 Because the structure 
and characteristics of each tranche's interest are based upon the original 
terms of the loans in the pool, trustees and servicers have limited discre­
tion to modify the terms of individual loans within a pool when faced 
with borrowers either in default or about to default. Each modification of 
a loan may result in an increase in income to one investor and a decrease 
to another. This requires a trustee to decide which tranche should receive 
more money, a decision that leaves the trustee exposed to litigation.1o:z 
A loan modification that reduces income to investors may also result in 
litigation. 103 Waiving a prepayment penalty when a loan is refinanced may 
also result in litigation by investors. 
In an unstable housing market, it may be difficult to determine which 
option will result in higher recovery for investors.104 Some servicers may re­
sort to the safest course, i.e., foreclosure or forbearance plans, which, when 
unsuccessful, ultimately result in foreclosure. 105 In an effort to address these 
types of concerns, various industry participants have issued loan modifica­
tion guidelines that focus on determining that the net present value of the 
payments on the modified loan is likely to be greater than the anticipated 
recovery from foreclosure. 1 Some lenders believe that a payment with(1(; 
similar affordability may be achieved through interest rate reductions and 
term extensions. Because a similar affordable payment could be achieved 
without a reduction in principal, the lender/investor would retain the op­
portunity to share in the appreciation when values rebound.107 
The capacity of servicers to engage in loan modifications is also an 
issue. 108 Increasing defaults expand the workload of servicers, and the 
rapid rate at which the defaults have occurred has contributed to those 
capacity problems. 109 In fact, servicers are having difficulty hiring skilled 
staff and finding outside vendors to assist. 110 Some servicers have had to 
increase their collection and loss mitigation staff by anywhere from 200 per­
cent to 500 percent. 111 Because all servicers are facing a simultaneous need 
for larger capacity, their inability to engage in loan modifications is read­
ily apparent. The Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, a group of state 
officials, believes that loss mitigation departments are overwhelmed and 
reported in April 2008 that seven out of ten delinquent borrowers were not 
in line to receive any kind of loan modification.u2 
Finally, servicing agreements provide a financial disincentive for 
servicers to engage in loan modifications that are estimated to cost be­
tween $500 and $1,0DO per loan, a cost that servicers must bear. 113 Servicers 
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also rely upon earning other fees that are directly impacted by the HOPE 
program. Most servicing agreements provide for a servicing fee calculated 
as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance. For prime loans, the fee is 
typically twenty-five basis points. For subprirne pools, the servicing fee is 
typically fifty basis points. 114 Because the HOPE program requires the prin­
cipal balance of the loan to be reduced to 90 percent of the market value, the 
program provides a disincentive because it lowers servicers' revenues. The 
HOPE program also requires fees relating to defaults, including late charges, 
to be waived.115 Most servicing agreements typically provide that fees relat­
ing to late payments and defaults may be retained by the servicer.116 
The HOPE program's impact on servicer behavior will likely be mini­
mal. Securitization requires that servicers act in the best interests of the in­
vestors.ll7 Financial survival requires that servicers earn profits. The HOPE 
program does not provide any financial incentives to servicers. Because an 
estimated 70 percent to 75 percent of outstanding first lien mortgages have 
been securitized,118 it is wtlikely that many of those loans will be modified 
or refinanced under the HOPE program. 
C. Second Lienholders Are Likely to Block Participation 
The HOPE program requires all subordinate liens to be extinguished as a 
condition of participation in the program. CBO estimates that 40 percent of 
all subprime and Alt-A loans have second liens.119 It is very unlikely that bor­
rowers with second liens will be able to participate in the HOPE program. 
Subordinate lienholders may refuse to extinguish their liens, a prerequisite 
for participation in the program, believing that the borrower's ability to 
make payments or the value of the home will be greater in the future. 120 
Although second lienholders might be persuaded to accept loan modifica­
tions outside of the HOPE program that preserve their interest, they are not 
likely to participate in a program that requires that their liens be released. 
Although subordinate lienholders owed more than $2,500 participating in 
the HOPE program may receive a share of future appreciation or a cash 
payout, lienholders owed less receive nothing under the program.121 The 
amount of the shared appreciation, 9 or 12 percent of future appreciation 
at a future date not yet determined, may not be enough to persuade junior 
lienholders to waive their interests.122 Neither the EESA or the regulations 
provide guidance on what the payments in lieu of a shared appreciation 
interest should be. If second (and first) lienholders perceive that foreclosure 
is imminent, participation may be more likely. 123 If those second liens are se­
curitized, for the same reasons discussed above, participation is unlikely. 
D. Additional Issues 
The HOPE program presents additional issues other than those arising 
from securitization and lack of voluntary participation. One of those 
issues arises from the wrong kind of participation by lenders, i.e., adverse 
selection. More than one regulator has expressed concern that lenders 
may choose those loans that are the least likely to succeed for the HOPE 
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program.121 Lenders engaging in adverse selection might willingly write 
down the principal balance of a loan that is not likely to succeed in return 
for receiving a loan that is fully federally insured against default. 125 The 
HOPE program legi'slation directed the HOPE board to establish standards 
and policies to protect against adverse selection.126 The legislation does not 
provide guidance as to what those standards should be other than stating 
that higher-risk loans may have to "demonstrate payment performance for 
a reasonable period of time prior to being insured Wlder the program."127 
Regulations adopted for the program have interpreted that legislative di­
rective to require that the borrower make one payment within 120 days 
after the closing of the program mortgage.128 The payment may not be 
made by the lender or escrowed at closing. 
Finally, permitting subordinate lienholders to participate in fuhtre ap­
preciation with the FHA but not pennitting existing senior mortgage 
holders to share in that appreciation will limit participation in the HOPE 
program. Senior mortgage lenders and servicers that can avoid a principal 
writedown and achieve affordable payments through interest rate reduc­
tions and term extensions have little incentive to participate.129 
IV. Conclusion 
The HOPE program is too little, too late for the many homeowners who 
faced foreclosure last year and the three million homeowners who are pre­
dicted to default this year. Given the significant barriers to success, it is Wl­
likely that the program will prevent a significant number of foreclosures or 
that it will stabilize the mortgage market. Providing help to 400,000 home­
owners is simply not enough, given the magnitude of the problem. The 
housing market is plagued by 12 million homeowners who owe more than 
their homes are worth. The problem is compounded by the record number 
of defaults resulting in foreclosrnes that lead to even further declines in 
home values. More comprehensive legislative solutions are sorely needed, 
and those solutions need to address the current market conditions and the 
lack of regulation that led to them. 
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